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BOOK REVIEWS
STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS.

By

George J. Annas. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. 291
Pp. $24.95.
Reviewed by John C. Fletcher*
George Annas, one of the nation's most active health care lawyers and
teachers, is a prolific contributor to the literature of bioethics. He is also
a creative and witty writer in a field whose main threat is probably not
"bioethics backlash" but editors who wantonly publish work so boring or
repetitive that it smothers readers' will-to-read. This book is a real pleasure to read and most of its positions are clearly argued.
The book's chapters are from Annas' recent essays and articles on major legal cases or disputes posing bioethical issues. Some collections are
inchoate, and their disunity is editorially masked by artifice of headings
and subheadings. The contents of this book are knit together by goals
that have long guided Annas' interests in bioethics: 1) to show that the
standard of care for medical practice rests as much or more on ethical
than on legal grounds, 2) to defend and renew constitutional protection
of individual civil and privacy rights in an era when a majority of the
Supreme Court displaces them in key decisions, and 3) to demonstrate
that the law has had a pervasive, even determinative, influence on American bioethics.
In bioethics, Annas sees this book as the first stage in a larger project
of values clarification. He wants here to explore the values at stake in
certain cases to provoke clarification of "which values deserve legal support in the U.S."' Beyond this goal, he envisions a larger project to clarify values that ought to underlie international human rights law. He
notes that human rights law is somewhat unfamiliar to U.S. bioethics because of the uniqueness of the U.S. Constitution in American legal and
* John C. Fletcher, Ph.D., Kornfeld Professor of Biomedical Ethics, University of
Virginia School of Medicine.
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cultural traditions. He does not develop a theory of human rights or.values in this book but points to a direction such a theory might take, i.e.,
"because human rights are based on human characteristics, the universal
is more important than the particular."2 At a future time, he intends to
develop an "international agenda for human rights in health."3 One must
await his future work on human rights and bioethics. Some obstacles for
a rights-based ethical theory are mentioned below.
This collection of writings of a columnist, lecturer, and essayist on law
and bioethical controversies mainly succeeds. Annas, who writes about
legal cases and bioethical issues very soon after they break into public
view, almost always "gets it right," in the sense of framing the problem
and making the judgments that need to be made. The book's main weakness stems, in my view, from unguarded claims and overstatements made
in the "Introduction" about the determinative role of law in shaping
American bioethics and social innovations like ethics committees. After
discussing the book's contents and strengths, the review concludes with
an analysis of this section.
Nineteen chapters are organized in three main parts: I. The U.S. Constitution and Bioethics; II. Private Sector Bioethics; and III. Public Sector
Bioethics. A final chapter reviews the history of the teaching of health
law, the perspectives from which it can be taught, and proposes that the
final "lost" semester of the third year of law school could be well-spent in
a total immersion in health law.
In explaining the contents of Part I, Annas writes, "The reconstituted
Reagan-Bush U.S. Supreme Court seems to have taken as its project increasing the power of the government to control the personal lives of its
citizens." 4 Annas holds that "constitutional law as we have come to know
it" is under attack by the conservative members of the Court and that it
cannot be relied upon to protect citizens from government intrusion into
the "doctor-patient relationship and into personal decision making regarding reproduction, birth, treatment refusals, and death."' Annas argues that a new "countervailing force" in the form of a "new bioethics" is
needed to protect individuals' personal liberties from unjustified intrusions at these times when individuals are so vulnerable to unwarranted
intrusions.
Accordingly, the chapters in Part I take up decisions by the U.S.
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id. at 11.
5. Id. at 11.
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Supreme Court, state courts, and some state and federal legislatures in
bioethical controversies over individual rights, the physician-patient relationship, and the authority of government to intrude. The cases discussed include Rust v. Sullivan6 (the "gag rule"), Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n7 (drug testing), National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab8 (drug testing), Washington v. Harper9 (forcible antipsychotic medication), In re A.C. 10 (forced Cesarean section on a dying
pregnant patient), Webster v. Reproductive Health Services11 and Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey'2 (abortion cases), In the Matter of Baby M 13 (commercial surrogate motherhood), Davis v. Davis v. King'4 (dispute over
ownership of frozen embryos), Johnson v. Calvert5 (child custody and a
non-genetic gestational mother), Cruzan16 (forgoing life sustaining treatment in persistent vegetative state) and a review of the variation between
New York and New Jersey state court decisions on forgoing treatment, as
well as legislation on advance directives. There is a too brief discussion of
the federal Patient Self-Determination Act as an initiative to educate citizens and protect their right to refuse life-prolonging treatments. This act,
almost entirely due to the Work of Senator John Danforth (R-MO), can
be seen as a kind of personal penance for what his state did to the Cruzan
family, although Danforth's interest in promoting advance directives
through public policy precedes the Cruzan case.
Part II, "Private Sector Bioethics," is intended to deal with areas "in
which the Constitution has never played a major role, either because they
have been dominated by private players or because the Constitution provides strong authority for government dominance. Here the major concern is more often money and markets than government power, and the
increasing shift from medical ethics to business ethics."' 7 This part includes chapters on AIDS and doctors' obligations to treat persons with
AIDS and the political strife regarding FDA drug trials for HIV and demands from AIDS activists for changes in regulations to speed testing of
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1259 (1993).
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
ANNAS, supra note 1, at 11.
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new drugs. It also includes an excellent chapter on the Human Genome
Project that seems out of place under a "private sector" heading, since
the initiative and its funding clearly occur in the public sector. It is true
that knowledge and information from the project create issues that span
the public and private sectors, including family life. A final case in this
8
that
section is that of Moore v. Regents of the University of California1
involved a dispute over researchers' selling a lucrative cell line for research without the prior knowledge of a patient from whom the cells
were obtained.
Part III, "Public Sector Bioethics," is intended to "address issues that
have not been dealt with by the law from a primarily constitutional perspective."' 19 It contains chapters on politics and fetal tissue transplants,
disputes over brain death, anencephalic infants and transplantation, consent to the artificial heart, and rationing medical care in a reformed
health care system. This part also includes a hypothetical Supreme Court
ruling set in the year 2020, "Minerva v. National Health Agency," that
defends criteria to ration the artificial heart. Another chapter criticizes
the inadequacies of moral reasoning used in choices to separate Siamese
twins. A concluding chapter in this part appears to be against permitting
assisted suicide in medicine, at least with the impersonal and distancing
means of Dr. Kervorkian's "killing machines." Annas does not take up
cases of physicians like Dr. Timothy Quill, who actively helped in a patient's suicide, and whose motives towards and relationship with the patient were much more fully formed than Dr. Kervorkian's. In my view,
he needs to address a harder case than Kervorkian's. Also, by not addressing the euthanasia question directly, he appears to veer away from
one of the strongest implications of his key principle of self-determination and its liberty interests. It is not clear where Annas stands on this
issue.
Many kinds of readers can use this book. Judges, legislators, and policy makers who confront disputes marked by bioethical issues will be interested. The book can be especially commended to those who write and
teach in bioethics, health law, or courses that combine both fields. Annas's case accounts, commentary, and analysis are good resources for
teaching and class discussion. Bioethicists who co-teach with health lawyers are always searching for contemporary material for courses. This
book contains excellent discussions of almost thirty recent legal cases
18. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
19. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 11.
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posing bioethical issues. Decisions in these cases expose choices among
sharply contested values in current political and judicial culture. The best
casebooks and textbooks in bioethics and health law are now somewhat
dated,20 organized around one major theme,2 ' or are primarily bioethics
texts that require supplemental legal material. 2
At the University of Virginia, we are experimenting with a course on
the history of bioethics using a "great cases" approach. What were the
formative causes of the new field of bioethics? Annas believes that the
law had a strong and even determinative role. One goal of the course is
to examine the extent to which certain cases, and the forces at work behind them, helped to create the field of bioethics. Another goal is to
compare the interpretation of different scholars who analyzed the cases.
Not all of the formative cases that influenced the field of bioethics started
as or evolved into court cases, but many of them obviously did. What
choices of cases ought one make for an ideal course?
Our one-semester course of student-led sessions now uses cases of 1)
coercive sterilization: Buck v. Bell,23 Relf v. Weinberger;4 2) human subjects research: the Thskegee syphilis study, the Jewish Hospital for
Chronic Disease cancer study; 3) rationing life-saving technology: the Seattle hemodialysis committee; 4) cases of Jehovah's Witness refusals of
blood transfusion: Brooks,2 5 Osborne,2 6 Labrenz,27 Georgetown;2 8 5)
abortion cases: Roe v. Wade,2 9 PlannedParenthoodv. Casey;3' 6) forgoing
life-sustaining treatment: Quinlan31 and Cruzan;3 2 7) physician assisted
death: Sigmund Freud's death by euthanasia, practices in the Netherlands, Dr. Quill's aid in Diane's suicide; 8) neonatal treatment decisions:
the Johns Hopkins Down syndrome case and later Baby Doe cases; 9)
futility cases: Helga Wanglie; 10) anencephaly and organ donation: Baby
Theresa, 11) the history of genetic testing for Huntington's disease; 12)
20.
21.

JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE, AND MEDICINE
ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1989).

(1984).

GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1990).
23. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

22.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Estate of Brooks v. Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965).
In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972).
People v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (III. 1952).
President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.

1964).
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

30. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
31. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
32. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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animal experimentation: Philadelphia head injury study); and 13) health
care reform at the state level: the Oregon plan. Annas' discussions concern some of these cases and themes, and his selection of cases is an excellent way to study the more recent history of bioethics. One clearly
needs two semesters to complete a full course.
A second strength in this volume is the author's consistent commitment
to an ethical position of human rights and values within a liberal political
polity. His larger ethical perspective is still evolving, based on his comments in the Introduction. There is no one place at which Annas gives an
extended description of his ethical perspective, although one can be fairly
confident that it combines elements of traditions of philosophical liberalism (Kant and Mill) and its political expressions (Rawls, Dworkin and
others). Clearly, a cornerstone of Annas' ethical perspective is the
supremacy of individual self-determination and the liberties enjoyed by
persons who have this capacity or who have had it and lost it. From this
core emanate a cluster of moral and legal rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and reproductive liberty.
These rights are invoked as the bodyguards of citizens in a liberal democracy whose main threat is from particularistic and absolutist views of
the good life competing for supreme loyalty in the arena of political and
judicial action. What one is not clear about is whether Annas holds that
government should be consistently neutral with regard to implementing
views of the good life embedded in particular resolutions of bioethical
controversies, including neutrality regarding the liberal ideal, or whether
he advocates that government's role is to promote the liberal ideal of
autonomy and self-determination as the surest way to realize the good
life in society. I infer that he prefers the latter direction, as indicated in
his discussion of health care reform, but he can clarify this question in
future writings.
Annas' is at his persuasive best arguing from his basic premise to protest intrusions into and infringements of self-determination and its attendant rights by government, large bureaucracies, and courts, especially
when disadvantaged and vulnerable persons are the major losers. He assails the Supreme Court majority's defense of the "gag rule," mandatory
drug testing, and forcing anti-psychotic medication on competent prisoners who may be a danger to themselves or others. His discussion of the
Angela Carder case, in which a court-ordered cesarean section was performed on a pregnant woman dying of cancer at George Washington University Hospital - against her stated wishes - is crystal clear on a
central moral and legal failure to recognize Ms. Carder as a person with
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rights. This case's impact was such that it is unlikely that the option of a
forced cesarean in a competent patient will be seriously considered by a
judge in the future, as shown already by an Illinois court.33 Annas' preparation of this important chapter, created from two of his articles, omitted
to include or cite his important response to a critical reply to his first
article from the attorney for the fetus. 34 Annas' reply stressed Ms.

Carder's competence at the time of her final refusal of a cesarean. It
would have been possible to refer to or include a summary of this important interchange. Much more recently and too late for reference in the
Annas volume, George Washington Hospital's ethics committee generated a comprehensive policy to guide its clinicians and administrators in
maternal-fetal conflicts of this type.35
Annas' discussion of Planned Parenthoodv. Casey36 by the Supreme
37
Court welcomes the joint opinion's reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade as constitutional law in abortion choices, but he criticizes their acceptance of
Pennsylvania's 24 hour waiting period after a required "informed consent" process. He views this requirement as flawed by an intent to inculcate guilt about abortion and by unfairness to women in rural areas and
the very young. He is critical of the "undue burden" test and finds it
unfairly used in the Pennsylvania decision. Annas sees the content of
Pennsylvania's consent process as demeaning to women as it appears to
presume that they have not heretofore considered the abortion choice
with moral seriousness.
Self-determination plainly has limits for Annas; he is not a libertarian.
In his view, one cannot simply justify any practice in the name of autonomy. Protecting individual dignity and especially equality between the
genders is such a limiting value on autonomy for Annas. He especially
wants to restrain commerce in human tissue, cells, body parts, and pregnancy. He condemns commercial surrogate motherhood, welcoming its
apparent cultural demise. He invokes norms against selling children, as
well describing a "classist and sexist" tendency as a "method to obtain
33. Penny Roberts, Baby Born into Path of Legal Storm,

CHI. TRIB.,

Dec. 31, 1993, at

1.
34. Barbara Mishkin, But She's Not an "Inanimate Container...", 18 HASTINGS
40-41, (June-July 1988) (replying to George Annas, She's Going to Die: The
Case of Angela C., HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (Feb.-Mar. 1988)).
35. Douglas Mishkin & Gail J. Povar, Decision Making with Pregnant Patients: A Policy Born of Experience, 19 J. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 291-302 (1993).
36. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).

CENTER REP.

37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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children genetically related to white males by exploiting poor women., 3 8
He comments that commercial surrogacy "subverted any principled notion of economic fairness and justice, and it undermines our society's
commitment to equality and the inherently priceless value of human
life.",39 Annas also criticizes the decisions of two California courts in the
Anna Johnson case to reject her claims to be the mother of a child because she was not genetically related to him. Johnson contracted to attempt a pregnancy that began with an embryo transfer and changed her
mind about her role as surrogate to assert a claim to be the rightful
mother of the child. Opposition to commercial surrogacy appears to be
the major motive for Annas' position here, as well as defense of a traditional definition of motherhood favoring the gestational parent. In the
Moore case decision, Annas criticizes the appeals court denial of a property interest to Moore in his cells as biased in favor of the biotechnology
industry. He favors amending U.S. patent law to prohibit the patenting
of human cells (including genes and gene fragments), and the Organ
Transplant Act to prohibit the sale of human tissue and cells for any
purpose. 4°
If self-determination is not an absolute value for Annas, it has a very
high but relative place in his commonwealth of values, depending upon
the issue before him. One can see a distinctive valuing process at work in
his discussion of rationing medical care, in which Annas responds to critiques from a communitarian perspective. He opens by describing the U.S.
health care system as "wasteful, technologically-driven, death-denying,
legalistic, and individualistic.",4 ' Annas' approach to health care reform
appears to be pluralistic and comprehensive, rather than a one-time reform, such as single-payer. He doubts that the U.S. is politically capable
of changing the fee-for-service compensation system or its commitment
to research. But what ought to be done? He accepts some of Daniel
Callahan's critique of American confusion of the goals of medicine and
obscurity of the natural life-span, but he tends to reject placing communitarian values, in this case, ahead of individual values. Indeed, he stresses
that more emphasis on self-determination can oppose "perverse communitarianism" of the type he sees practiced in Missouri's forcing the
Cruzan family to continue treatment and preserve life, "regardless of its
quality." In a key passage, he states:
38.
39.
40.
41.

ANNAS,
ANNAS,
ANNAS,
ANNAS,

supra note 1, at 61.

supra note 1, at 61.
supra note 1, at 176.
supra note 1, at 211.
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The health care system of every country is shaped by the country's political system and values, not the other way around. The
pluralistic American political system was not founded on the
idea that the government should control our daily lives, but on
the notion that the government exists to enhance the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the individual, and thereby the
community. With liberty as its hallmark, we once believed (and
I think we still do) that life without liberty is not worth living.
Thus to argue that the problem with Americans is that we put
too high a value on self-determination, and should look for
other values instead to live by, is to argue against our basic political system itself.4 2
It is hard to construct a compelling ethical argument for comprehensive
health care reform in the United States using liberty as the guiding value,
since the ideology of individualism is a great obstacle for that reform. In
any such argument liberty needs to share equal time with social justice
and equality, values that provide more guidance as to the kinds of communities and persons needed for the task of redistributing economic arrangements to insure access to basic health care for all Americans and the
strangers in our midst at any given time. Appeals to liberty will insure
that reforms will not make health care slaves of Americans. But liberty
does not give insight into the profound unfairness of the status quo and
the monumental task to be done. As a societal goal, health care, which
includes nutrition and preventive medicine, differs from other goals, like
education, housing, commerce and work, in that it is a presupposition to
claim and enjoy the fullness of the other goals. Without basic health care,
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" cannot be claimed by persons
at all. A government and a private sector with the capacity to insure that
all persons have equal access to health care, and fail consistently to do so,
do not violate the obligations of liberty so much as those of justice and
equality. Inasmuch as these other values play a role in his thought in
other places, why does not Annas share liberty's obligations with those of
social justice and equality? But, other than his reference to Callahan, he
does not interact with other major contributors to the debate on concepts
of justice and redistribution of medical services, e.g., Norman Daniels,
Ronald Dworkin, Annette Baier, and Ezekiel Emmanuel, among many
others.
In a fourth edition of a well-known text, Beauchamp and Childress
write, "We suspect that no part of the moral vocabulary has done more to
42. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 216.
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protect the legitimate interests in political states than the language of
rights."4 3 They also point out that the major weakness of locating basic
ethics in rights is that
rights is only a piece of a more general account that stakes out
what makes a claim valid. Justification of the system of rules
within which valid claiming occurs is not itself rights-based.
Pure rights-based accounts also run the risk of truncating or impoverishing our understanding of morality, because rights cannot account for the moral significance of motives,
supererogatory actions, virtues, and the like."
The major task for a rights-based view of ethics, which Annas can pursue,
is to increase the dialectic with other perspectives and themes in different
traditions than human rights. Such work will be needed especially if he
desires to traverse the territory of an international (and cross-cultural)
perspective on human rights.
There is a societal layer latent in Annas' ethical thought which emerges
in choices not to rely on one dominant principle as he weighs and makes
judgments in particular cases. As suggested in a review of an earlier
work,4 5 Annas needs to reach for a more balanced account of society's
interests in bioethical conflicts and of the variety of human communities
that must co-exist within the rights-giving and rights-protecting society.
In what our ideology seems to stress, we liberals are usually right in what
we affirm (self-determination and liberty interests) and wrong in what we
deny (legitimate interests of particular communities).
Finally, the substance of the Introduction must be discussed. Annas
often "gets it right" ethically and legally in the chapters of the book, but
he is badly off target in its starting pages. This section does not fit well
with the remainder of the book in terms of its quality. Annas begins by
reminiscing about a Seattle conference in September, 1992, organized by
Albert Jonsen and the University of Washington on the "Birth of
Bioethics."4 6 The occasion marked the 30th anniversary (Nov. 9, 1962) of
Shana Alexander's article in Life47 . She exposed a tendency among
members of a Seattle committee to use social merit in recommending
43. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP AND JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics 77 (4th ed. 1994).
44. Id. at 76.
45. John C. Fletcher, What are Society's Interests in Human Genetics and Reproductive
Technologies?, 16 L., MED., & HEALTH CARE 131 (1988).
46. Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, 23 HASTINoS CENTER REP. S1 (Special
Supp., Nov.-Dec. 1993).
47. Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102.
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who among the many end-stage renal patients should receive the then
scarce life-saving treatment of hemodialysis. A keynoter, Alexander used
the podium that day less to revisit her article than to argue in favor of
physician assisted death. In this vein, she said to the audience, "I trust my
lawyer more than I trust my doctor." Interestingly, her remark does not
appear in Jonsen's edited edition of her talk. 41 She meant that her lawyer, whom she knew intimately, could be more trusted with knowledge
about her desire to be spared suffering and have a good death at the end
than her current doctor, a virtual stranger. Her most trusted physician
had died and another had moved away after "burn-out." Annas accurately recalls the surprise and stir that this comment caused, but he blurs
the context of her statement, i.e., her desire for help in dying. Nonetheless, Annas takes off from Alexander's remark about her lawyer to make
a case that American law has had the single greatest influence to date on
bioethics. He writes that the assembled bioethicists should not have been
surprised by her comment, since the civil rights law tradition is dedicated
to protection of individual rights against arbitrary uses of power by government or physicians. He then states, "This is why American law, not
philosophy or medicine, is primarily responsible for the agenda, development and current state of American bioethics., 49 Thus begins an excursion into overstatement.
To illustrate how pervasive the law's influence has been on bioethics in
America, Annas cites the growth of ethics committees of all types.
Among these are: Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to conduct prior
review of research with human subjects, Institutional Ethics Committees
(IECs) in healthcare institutions concerned with patient care issues, and
the ethics committees of professional and specialty organizations, like
those of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology and the American Fertility Society, that began in the 1980s. Annas mentions briefly the Ethical, Legal and Social
Implications Program of the Human Genome Project under the heading
of "Ethics at the Governmental Level," but he omits the more influential
work of government-sponsored bodies like the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects and the President's Commission for
Ethical Problems in Medicine. Annas' view seems to be that all of these
groups largely function to protect the interests of the institutions in which
they are housed. He sees them as having come about due to legal con48. Shana Alexander, Thirty Years Ago, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP.S5 (Special Supp.
Nov.-Dec. 1993).
49. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 3.
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cerns. They are less concerned with formulating ethical considerations,
and more concerned with "providing ethical cover" to protect the institutions that do research, for physicians, for the business practices of practitioners, and for the Human Genome Project. He ends this section calling
for a "real effort to see if multidisciplinary committees can 'do ethics' and
encourage real change in our hospitals and medical care facilities to go
beyond the law and risk management to 'do the right thing.' Good ethics
(and a good ethics committee) begins where the law ends."5
There are two serious shortcomings here. The first is that these statements are inaccurate in a historical sense; i.e., neither bioethics as a
movement, or as a field, nor such committees in particular can be explained as due primarily to the influence of law. A second shortcoming is
that he oversimplifies both the problems and performance of such committees, compromising his argument by a morally self-defeating position.
I think that he wants these groups to succeed but does not give an accurate account of their history or a vision for a future in which they can
succeed. Annas probably believes that society is better than worse off for
the aggregate work of such committees. He does not state this belief explicitly, but it is implicit in statements like the one cited just above. Does
Annas seriously desire to return to a time when there were no such
groups? If not, why not?
The answer is that such groups function - some better and some worse to meet two needs in the interactions of a pluralistic society with the research and health care communities. The first need is to share power in
decision making - about what research ought to be done and under what
conditions and how ethical problems in patient care are optimally addressed in the local setting. A second need is to enlarge ethical foresight
about uses of medical technology, beginning in the laboratory and ending
at the bedside. In the case of the second need, IECs and IRBs can play
some role in identifying problems and concerns, but public bioethics
groups at the government level clearly play a much larger and more influential role. Annas does not really address the question of how public
bioethics ought to be done, but he has done so since this book.5 1
Addressing these two societal needs - to share power and enlarge ethical foresight - are also involved in explaining why there is a bioethics
movement and a field of studies by the same name. In my view, society
50. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 10.
51. George J. Annas, Will the Real Bioethics (Commission) Please Stand Up?, 19
TINGS CENTER REP. (Jan.-Feb. 1994).
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needed bioethics before there was such an entity, or it would not have
appeared. Why was there a bioethics movement at all? These two needs
were not being adequately met with the conceptual and institutional resources available to researchers and clinicians in the 1950s and 1960s. It
is true that researchers reached out more readily to lawyers like Irving
Ladimer, William Curran, and to physicians with strong legal interests,
like Jay Katz, for help to construct new resources to meet these needs
than to philosophers, theologians, or social scientists, but even their kind
of reaching out differs radically from an interpretation that they had to
do it "because of law." To say that IRBs were "created by law"52 is literally true but historically incomplete. The National Research Act of 1974
was the culmination of at least two decades of growing evidence that the
ethical resources within the research communities were insufficient to
protect human subjects. However, IRBs were not created by law; they
evolved from earlier forms and legal requirements were added for gender, membership from several disciplines, and at least one non-institutional member. The earliest precursors of IRBs were small groups, at
first only composed of researchers, to examine research protocols that
significantly departed from standard practice. An early example, but
probably not the first, was organized as a subgroup of the Medical Board
when the Clinical Center, NIH, opened in 1953. 5" Welt's research in the
late 1950's showed that these groups were rare.54 Although researchers
themselves were aware of the value of prior group review of research for
protection for subjects, their spotty efforts were insufficient to prevent
the research ethics megadisasters of the 1960s (e.g., Jewish Hospital for
Chronic Diseases cancer study), the 1970s (e.g., the revelation of the Tuskegee syphilis study active since 1932), and those that still come to light
today (e.g., the Department of Energy's reports about studies involving
radioactivity). No prior group review of these and many other ethically
unjustified studies actually took place. In the early 1960s, leaders at the
NIH were weighing the merits of requiring prior group review when the
consequences of the Jewish Hospital experiment and the first transplant
of a baboon heart to a human5 5 without any scientific or ethical discus52. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 6.
53. Minutes of the Medical Board, Clinical Center, NIH, March 3, 1953. A document
describing the Clinical Research Committee and the policy of the NIH, "Group Consideration of Clinical Research Procedures Deviating from Accepted Medical Practice or Involving Unusual Hazard," was issued in 1954.
54. Louis G. Welt, Reflections on the Problems of Human Experimentation,25 CONN.
MED. 75 (1961).
55. James D. Hardy, et al., Heart Transplantationin Man, 188 JAMA 1132 (1964).
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sion propelled them into action. The main impetus for IRBs was the 1966
decision by NIH and PHS officials that local prior group review must
precede application for funding support.
My main point in reviewing the story of IRBs, which could be done
with each of the other ethics committees of which Annas is so critical, is
that these stories are far richer and more complex than his account suggests. Most of all, I disagree with his interpretation that they were either
created by law or in response to fear of litigation. This theme is not absent, but it is not dominant. A more accurate account of their causes is
that these groups were institutional expressions of influence from a
bioethics movement to address the same two societal needs that brought
the movement into being along with other expressions of enlarging civil
rights at the time, i.e., a need to share power in crucial decision making,
and a need to enlarge foresight in the uses of medical technology. Ethics
committees of various types are a later expression of the efforts of society, local reformers, and health care institutions to come to grips with
these needs. If this needs-based premise is true, then it follows that one
needs a larger view than Annas provides for the history of bioethics and a
broader vision and strategy to encourage the improvement of the performance of ethics committees.
In the history of bioethics, law was one discipline and institution among
many that responded to needs within society and its interactions with research and health care that were not being met by the traditions that
nurtured researchers and clinicians. Annas mentions only "philosophy
and medicine" as other contributors to the agenda and development of
bioethics, an account that neglects the moral labors of too many others to
go unchallenged. In the 1960s, early contributors to a future interdisciplinary field that came to be known as "bioethics" were from the social
sciences (e.g., Bernard Barber, Rened Fox, Herbert Kelman, Talcott Parsons, Donald Warwick), theological ethics (e.g., Joseph Fletcher, Paul
Ramsey, Immanuel Jakobovitz), as well as philosophy and medicine. Annas' too brief account fails to give credit where credit is due.
Annas' views of the state of affairs among ethics committees and of the
pervasive role of law in bioethics need to be examined against historical
accounts of the period before the "birth of bioethics" (1953-70) and evaluations of how the bioethics movement has succeeded and failed. Moreover, Annas' hope for the "good ethics" that he wants committees to do
seems to be in direct conflict with his assessment of a culture within which
this work is to be done. Does he seriously accept Joseph Campbell's indictment of a culture so shattered that has "no ethos" and is held together

Book Review

19941

only by law and lawyers?5 6 This theme seems self-defeating to his stated
project. There is obviously a contradiction here. From what sources will
the concepts, materials, and tools for the "good ethics" that he desires
arise if not from streams of political and ethical traditions within the culture? From whence does Annas derive his own ideas except from a certain stream within the culture?
If his real desire is to provoke bioethics and ethics committees of all
types to excel in their special tasks, he needs to be more precise about
those tasks and the resources and standards required for them, rather
than to dismiss them simply as "cover" to comfort the captains of research and health care. After all, these groups are composed of the many
thousands of recruits to a bioethics movement in which he is a leader.
The question is: what do they need to flourish and grow in knowledge and
skill? He neglects this larger task, which is very much on the agenda of
contemporary bioethics. Annas is a talented writer and sharp critic in
contemporary health law and bioethics. However, at times he seems to
want to stand outside of the workaday world of bioethics to throw stones
rather than develop the perspectives and tasks that will help this movement mature, endure, and be transmitted to future generations.

56.

ANNAS,

supra note 1, at 12, 258.
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